ABSTRACT Dynamic smart grid operations require that utilities that incorporate intermittent renewable energy resources provide creative and inclusive solutions to reduce and shift electrical demand. Commercial building HVAC systems have been used as a dispatchable load, but are limited by the lack of interoperability. Increased operability can be achieved using a secure and reliable interconnection device, which can provide direct bidirectional communications between the utility and the building automation system (BAS) controllers. This paper developed and tested a building automation intrusion detection system (BAIDS) that can provide a cyber-secure connection between public and private BAS networks. The BAIDS was used in a hardware-in-the-loop experiment that connected an actual photovoltaic array with a BAS control test bed and a building zone model. The BAIDS device allowed for critical control signals to pass from the public network directly to a fan controller in a BAS private network. At the same time, the BAIDS device provided intrusion detection monitoring to identify malicious activity. The network traffic was evaluated using an adaptive resonance theory (ART) artificial neural network. The ART algorithm was able to learn normal traffic activity on the private and public networks. The algorithm was then used to detect unauthorized attempts to access the interconnection device and a malicious cyber-physical attack on the BAS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Building infrastructure can support smart grid applications, including the integration of non-dispatchable renewable resources and resiliency measures. There have been a number of studies that describe various aspects of this paradigm, in which buildings are not seen only as passive loads. Building systems can also be active participants in the energy delivery and generation system. As contributors to the smart grid, buildings can be managed intelligently to reduce the overall electrical demand permanently through energy efficiency measures, or at short timescales using demand response (DR) controls [1] . Siano [2] discusses the potential benefits of using DR as an integral part of smart grid operations, including deferred upgrades and reduced capital costs. Enabling technologies for smart grid applications, such as smart meters, communication systems and energy controllers, requires a high degree of interoperability.
Increased interoperability with commercial building heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) equipment can provide more predictable and accurate responses to grid needs [3] . Targeted investments to upgrade and expand the use of automated control systems in commercial and industrial facilities have been estimated to double the ability of buildings to shed electrical loads quickly [4] . However, connecting different information technology systems, software applications, and platforms to communicate and exchange data offers many challenges. This increased functionality introduces new vulnerabilities that are susceptible to cyber attack vectors that can spoof data, manipulate control settings, and modulate device disconnects [5] . Data and control signals must be transferred reliably and securely through complex networks while completely avoiding cyber attacks [6] .
Communication systems for DR activities require sophisticated security protocols. The exchange or transmission of data between devices must be trusted to avoid privacy leaks, malicious denial-of-service attacks, and undetected modifications of information by unauthorized individuals or systems [7] . Wang and Lu [8] warns that the operations of critical systems can be delayed, blocked or corrupted by denial-ofservice attacks. Also, targeted attacks, that disrupt sensor values, change system settings or modify control commands, can create safety problems or equipment damage.
Robust and trusted network connections are critical for expanding DR capabilities in commercial buildings. This work developed and tested a device that will improve network connectivity for DR applications while minimizing the potential for successful cyber attacks. The proposed Building Automation Intrusion Detection System (BAIDS) bridges the private BAS local area network (LAN) with the internet or public network as shown in Figure 1 . The private LAN interconnects devices within a limited area and restricts outside access. Alternatively, the public network allows anyone access to other networks or the internet. The bridge between the public and private networks grants a centralized controller the ability to establish two-way communication with existing BAS control networks. This allows for more detailed control configurations that incorporate dispatchable loads from a large set of buildings. It can also consider occupant comfort as a control parameter. The BAIDS was tested in an hardware-in-the-loop experiment that connected a building zone thermal model, a photovoltaic (PV) array, and a building automation testbed. The experiment also tested passive cyber intrusion detection capabilities by FIGURE 1. The Building Automation Intrusion Detection System (BAIDS) connects building automation controls devices located on a local area network (LAN) directly with a centralized controller. The centralized controller is then able to implement demand response activities at a larger scale while considering a broad range of parameters such as occupant comfort.
analyzing inbound and outbound traffic on the local and public networks.
The network traffic monitoring systems deployed within the BAIDS device included the collection and analysis of network traffic. The traffic was collected using a network sensor that read message values and the associated metadata. It then inserted the information into an onboard elasticsearch database. The data was accessed by an Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) neural network that first learned normal behavior. It was then presented with previously unseen traffic and was able to detect two types of cyber attacks. The first attack was an unauthorized attempt to access the BAIDS device using SSH. The second malicious activity was a cyberphysical attack from inside the BAS that shut off lights and the HVAC fan. The ART algorithm successfully identified the attacks with minimal false positives.
II. BACKGROUND
Connecting centralized controllers with BAS has been discussed by Piette et al. [9] . Reliable connections can be achieved using devices that comply with the Open Automated Demand Response (OpenADR) standard [10] . The open standard provides a non-proprietary interface for utility companies to send control signals to a building system with the intent of modifying electrical loads. The OpenADR architecture uses the open internet to connect the utility or Independent System Operator to a DR Automation Server (DRAS). An internet connection has been used to connect the DRAS with a Client Logic Integrated Relay (CLIR) or gateway [11] . The signal then penetrates the BAS using an internet relay for the CLIR or through a web service client in the case of the gateway application [12] . However, current research has limited information regarding the security for the gateway connection in DR applications. The BAIDS can provide the added security necessary to create a fast and trustworthy connection between the utility and the commercial building control network.
A secure connection with the BAS is necessary because cyber adversaries can easily exploit the BAS network to attack both corporate network devices and HVAC systems. For example, the corporate network at a Target retail store in the United States was breached by international adversaries who used the BAS network to access the corporate network and were able inject code into the credit card machines [13] . The code read and delivered the card information of hundreds of customers to the adversaries. Additionally, the common HVAC communication protocol, known as BACnet, has many vulnerabilities, and was not originally designed with cyber security in mind.
Building automation professionals have recognized security issues associated with BAS [14] and have implemented various security measures to protect private BAS control networks. Many of the methods include the segregation of the BAS network from the public network. In these cases, BAS professionals have built a secure firewall around the BAS networks. The firewall allows authorized users to access the controls network through virtual private network connections or remote desktop access [15] . Proposals have also been made to improve the communication protocol by wrapping security into the BACnet messages [16] . However, BACnet embedded security measures are not robust. For example, session keys used to encrypt transmitted data can be manipulated. The BACnet protocol is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks, parallel interleaving attacks, and replay attacks [17] . Maintaining the integrity of the building's public and BAS networks is a critical task that must be conducted in parallel with the DR controls. An interconnection device, such as the proposed BAIDS, can provide meaningful DR control capabilities while maintaining a high level of security.
The BAIDS connects centralized controllers directly with individual BAS devices. The connection allows centralized control algorithms to modulate fan speeds, turn off lights, change thermostat states, and receive status updates. The connection is achieved with a bridge between the BAS network and the public network. The interconnection requires robust security measures that include intrusion detection algorithms. Intrusion detection methods have been developed for many different applications, including building automation networks. The algorithms must be adaptive to accurately detect different types of attacks. Attack methods are dynamic and continually change with time and technology. Data mining platforms have been developed to adapt and collect many different types of features that describe network topologies and traffic [18] . Anomaly detection frameworks have focused on the BACnet protocol and have used modern databases and advanced analysis methods such as an inductive rule learning algorithm to classify traffic with very low false positive rates [19] . Other detection algorithms have identified anomalies at very low error rates using an artificial neural network [20] . Tonejc et al. [21] compared clustering, random forests, one-class support vector machines, and support vector dimensionality reduction unsupervised machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection in BACnet networks.
Past approaches have been shown to be effective. Yet, many including the support vector machine, require training and testing data sets in order to analyze new data streams. The ART algorithm, on the other hand, has the ability to learn behavior, store the memory, and then delete past data. This allows the BAIDS device to operate without a large amount of data storage and limits its need for communication with an off-site storage system. The present work tested the ART algorithm's ability to learn normal behavior and then identify brute-force and cyber-physical attacks.
III. METHODOLOGY
Modernization of the electric grid can include the integration of large-scale, on-demand control of commercial building HVAC equipment. The simultaneous control of numerous HVAC equipment can be coordinated from a centralized platform in a secure and reliable manner. This type of control has the potential to synchronize building power demand with renewable energy output. For example, DR can be used to smooth cloud-driven intermittency as described by Mammoli et al. [22] . This synchronization requires a direct connection between the renewable energy resources and building HVAC equipment. The BAIDS provides this link with a cyber secure, bidirectional connection that provides reliable communication with existing HVAC devices for advanced DR control. This paper reports on a hardwarein-the-loop experiment that used an actual PV array and a highly functional building automation testbed. The experiments tested the ability of the BAIDS to transfer DR signals to the control network while providing a high level of cyber oversight to prevent malicious activity.
A. BUILDING AUTOMATION INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
The BAIDS was deployed in a Raspberry Pi (RPi) linux computer that connected the public and private networks and had 1 GB of ram and 32 GB of memory. The RPI is a cost effective, reliable, and energy efficient computer that has been applied to various applications [23] . For example, the RPI has been used as a data management server [24] , it has been applied to smart grid applications [25] , and it has been integrated into PV systems for advanced monitoring and analysis [26] . In the present work, the RPI was used to control HVAC devices, monitor network traffic, and display performance results.
The RPI was equipped with Python programming language code to transmit control signals, monitor network activity, and detect traffic anamolies. Custom Python code was developed to retrieve PV output data, calculate the fan motor control signal, and then transmit the signal to the actual control device. The transmission of the control signal was achieved using custom Python code that could communicate with the BACnet protocol. The network monitoring code used Pcapy Python extension module, which uses the libcap packet capture library that can discover transmitted and received messages. The RPI device was also used to store and display system performance and network traffic data. This storage and visualization system was provided by elasticsearch database and Kibana HMI. The RPI was also equipped with ART algorithm Python code that analyzed traffic every minute.
B. TESTBED & PHOTOVOLTAIC ARRAY
Commercial buildings typically have multiple rooms for office space, conference rooms, and other uses. The rooms are designed strategically for heating and cooling by defining thermal zones. A thermal zone is a space within a building that can include one or more rooms that are controlled by a single thermostat. The conditioning of the thermal zones can be controlled using a BAS. The Building Automation Control System (BACS) testbed, located at Sandia National Laboratory, was built to simulate common BAS used to heat and cool thermal zones. The testbed has several controllers, boiler, lighting, energy meter, chiller, fan, duct work dampers, and thermostats (T-Stat). Figure 2 shows the infrastructure VOLUME 5, 2017 used in this experiment, including the T-Stat, zone damper, damper actuator, fan motor, and the BAS controller.
The experiment used the commercially available control system, known as Delta Controls, to simulate a typical cooling of a single thermal zone. The system uses the BACnet protocol to transfer control messages. It was originally operating on a secure LAN that was segregated from any public network. The experiment connected the BAIDS device to the BAS LAN and a public network. This connection allowed for DR signals to be sent from a nearby PV power plant to the HVAC fan. On the other side of the laboratory was a 10.8kW PV array ( Figure 3 ) that had a monitoring system connected to a public network. The PV array consisted of four strings each with 10 modules in series that terminated at a single inverter. The inverter was connected to the electric grid. The monitoring system collected DC data from a combiner box and AC data from the inverter. The measured AC output from the PV array was sent to the BAIDS device and was used to control the fan motor in the BACS testbed. The testbed and the PV array were connected through as simple network topology that included the BAIDS as a key link between the public and private networks.
FIGURE 4.
The demonstration had multiple network connections. First, local weather and solar PV data was accessed through an API on the public network. Second, control signals and performance feedback were sent and received on the private network connection. Additionally, the BAS and public network traffic were monitored on the spam and public ethernet connections respectively. The BAIDS used a Raspberry Pi (RPi) to connect the two networks. The RPi ran Python programming language scripts to send signals and monitor traffic. It also used elastic-search database to store and view historical data.
C. NETWORK TOPOLOGY
The network topology connected the PV array with the BACS testbed HVAC devices as shown in Figure 4 . A hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) application programming interface (API) was used to transfer the data from the PV monitoring system to the BAIDS device. The BAIDS device was connected to the public network through the ethernet 1 (eth1) connection provided by a network switch. The BAIDS device was also connected to the BAS switch through the ethernet 0 (eth0) spam port and the ethernet 2 (eth2) private network. The spam port, labeled as eth0, connection was used to monitor all the traffic in the BAS network and perform intrusion detection evaluations. The eth2 network connection was established to send control signals to the BAS devices. This connection was also used to connect the zone thermal model with the testbed. For example, the air flow rate, measured by a pitot tube sensor, was sent to the thermal model in realtime. Finally, the weather, solar PV, HVAC performance, and network traffic data could be visualized in a human machine interface (HMI). The HMI was developed using elasticsearch database and Kabana visualization tools.
D. HARDWARE-IN-THE-LOOP SETUP
The experiment integrated an actual solar PV plant and a real fan motor/damper system with a virtual thermal zone model. The setup created a hardware-in-the-loop situation where the actual damper position was dependent on the temperature output of the zone model. Also, the fan motor speed was a function of the power output produced by the solar PV array. The experiment showed that an HVAC fan could be synchronized with a PV plant using a cyber secure connection without degrading the occupant comfort.
FIGURE 5.
The hardware-in-the-loop experiment connected the BAIDS device to the BACS testbed. BAIDS controlled the testbed fan based on the solar PV power. The output from the fan and damper system was input into the zone model located within the BAIDS device. The output from the model was then sent to the thermostat within the testbed.
The experiment had four significant connections that were necessary to provide reliable DR. The connections, shown in a) Zone model temperature → BAIDS fan control algorithm (and BACS testbed thermostat) The HTTP API connection provided the most current solar PV power production value (P PV ). The P PV value was used as an input for the fan controller equation: %Speed = P PV − min(P PV ) max(P PV ) − min(P PV ) (max(P fan motor )) 1 3 (1)
Equation 1 provided a scaling of the P PV to define the fan motor speed. It applied the affinity law properties where the fan power is equal to the cube of the speed. The control signal (s) sent to the actual fan motor in the BASC testbed using BACnet UDP/IP was defined by a simple if statement (2):
where s was equal to the fan speed, calculated in Equation 1, when the zone temperature was between 21.6 and 23.8 • C during the occupied hours of 8 in the morning to 5 in the afternoon. When the temperature was outside of the defined threshold, no command was sent and the fan motor and the system operated as instructed by the existing control software.
The actual air flow from the fan travelled through duct work to a damper controlled by an actuator. The flow that passed the damper section was measured by a pitot tube sensor and the value was sent to the zone model using BACnet UDP/IP read commands. The zone model also made queries of the HTTP API to collect the most recent ambient temperature value. Based on these two actual inputs the zone model ran a first order differential equation to compute the zone temperature (3):
where M is the air mass inside the zone, T z is the zone temperature, Q is the thermal load, m is the mass flow rate of air to heat or cool the space, C p is the specific heat capacity of air, and T s is the supply air temperature The thermal load (Q) was computed for a zone that was 3 meter long by 4 meters wide and 2.4 meters tall. Three of the wall surfaces had adjacent interior walls and one surface had an exterior wall that faced west. The thermal load for the zone was defined by (4):
whereQ interior is the interior load, UA is the heat transfer coefficient times the surface area, T ext,int is either adjacent space temperature, T z is the zone temperature. The interior load was estimated based on a standard occupancy of one person and one computer during normal business hours of 8 in the morning until 5 in the evening. The heat transfer coefficient was assumed to be 2W/m 2 K for the four walls. The T ext temperature was the outside temperature extracted from the HTTP API and T int was a constant value of 20 • C that represented the adjacent interior space temperatures.
The model was run every minute and output the zone temperature at the particular instance. This output was stored in the onboard database and was sent to the testbed control system. The value was read on the actual thermostat and it was accessed by the damper control system. The damper actuator modulated independently based on the difference between the zone temperature and the set-point value.
E. NETWORK TRAFFIC SENSOR
Bidirectional connections with existing BAS networks require that control networks remain accessible to the outside world. However, accessible internet connections allow VOLUME 5, 2017 adversaries to access critical data, devices, and equipment. Therefore, BAS are often connected on private networks that do not allow public access. The BAIDS provides access to the private BAS networks by creating a secure bridge between the public and private BAS network. The secure connection required the implementation of a passive intrusion detection system (IDS) that monitored traffic on both the public and private networks.
Passive IDS provides security in networks and computers by identifying unauthorized access and misuse in real time [27] . The monitoring provides critical alerts that identify potential attacks. It can also help operators find vulnerabilities within the system. In this experiment, IDS was embedded inside of the BAIDS to monitor traffic along two network segments. The monitoring was performed using custom developed Python script.
The Python sensor monitored and classified TCP, UDP, ICMP traffic based on the following rules: 1) Unknown source IP: Inbound and outbound traffic that originated at an unknown IP address. 2) Unknown destination IP: Inbound and outbound traffic that terminated at an unknown IP address. 3) Unknown source port: Inbound and outbound traffic that originated at an unknown port. 4) Unknown destination port: Inbound and outbound traffic that terminated at an unknown port. 5) BAS traffic: Frequency of inbound and outbound traffic from each device in the BAS network. 6) BAIDS traffic: Frequency of inbound and outbound traffic from the public network. The Python script used the existing pcapy library to capture network packets. Pcapy is highly effective when used in conjunction with a packet-handling package such as Impacket. Impacket is a collection of Python classes for constructing and dissecting network packets. The network traffic data was stored in the database and accessed by the IDS algorithm.
F. INTRUSION DETECTION ALGORITHM
Artificial neural networks (ANN) are a form of machine learning that emulate a simplified version of an animal's nervous system for the purposes of acquiring and storing knowledge. ANN provide a high level learning system that can perform complex computations, and calculate many nonlinear problems. The BAIDS device used an ART ANN to learn normal traffic behavior and then detect abnormal activity that could represent potentially harmful cyber attacks. The unsupervised ANN algorithm was created by Grossberg and Carpenter and includes various versions (ART 1, ART 2, ART 3, and Fuzzy ART). ART 1 is an architecture that can be used for clustering of binary inputs only [28] . ART 2 improved upon the ART 1 architecture to support continuous inputs. Fuzzy ART, used in the present work, incorporates fuzzy set theory into the pattern recognition process [29] . The Fuzzy ART approach can provide stable categorization of analog input patterns. The fuzzy logic improves the generalization of the algorithm which increases its ability to perform classification. The ART algorithm incorporates a vigilance parameter (ρ), which can be characterized as a similarity parameter. This parameter is used to judge the similarity between all of the input patterns. The basic structure of the Fuzzy ART architecture is shown in Figure 6 . This flow chart describes the interconnection of the different layers that are designated as F0, F1, and F2. The F0 layer is for the normalization and complement coding of the input values, and is considered a preprocessing operation. The F1 layer, which includes the choice and vigilance calculations, performs the recognition of features in the data. This process includes a reset that is based on a vigilance a parameter (ρ), and is considered the orienting subsystem [30] . The final layer, F2, is where the categorization occurs. Similar to other ANN architectures, the Fuzzy ART has a weight (or template) matrix where the algorithm stores expectations or memory.
The template matrix computations occur between the F1 and F2 layers. First, the free parameters α, ρ, and β must be set. The choice parameter, α, can assume values between 0 and infinity, but is typically very small. The learning rate, β, is often set to 1. The vigilance parameter, ρ, must be between 0 and 1, and determines the fineness of the clusters. The first step finds the templates that match best with the input pattern according to Equation 5 :
Then, a vigilance test is computed using the best choice template from Equation 5 and the input using Equation 6 . 
where X is the preprocessed input matrix, T j is the template (weight) vector, c is the choice function vector and ∧ is the fuzzy set theory conjunction or minimum operator. The ART architecture is useful for pattern recognition and categorization because it can adapt easily to significant variations through a normalization. It can also recognize subtle differences in input patterns which is critical for accurate decision making. Additionally, the algorithm can perform detailed recognition of features and is guaranteed to converge on a solution. The memory can easily be stored and accessed in the onboard database. These attributes make it a good candidate for evaluating BAS and other network traffic data streams.
G. CYBER ATTACK TESTS
The BAIDS device was presented with two types of attacks: (1) brute-force attack on the BAIDS device from the public network, and (2) cyber-physical attack that altered HVAC and lighting states in the BAS. The brute-force attack is where an attacker attempts to guess the correct passwords or passphrases with the intent to eventually gain access or shut down the system. In this experiment, the simulated attacker attempted to gain entry using the secure shell (SSH) protocol. The attacker made 4 consecutive unsuccessful attempts using common usernames and passwords. The second cyber test was successfully executed on the BAS.
The BAS is a type of cyber-physical system that has various mechanisms (fans, lights, etc) controlled and monitored by computer-based algorithms. The simulated adversary in the test gained access to the system and was able to identify critical control points in the BAS. The adversary was then able to deploy code that sent signals to the fan motor and light switches that altered the states in a negative manner. This attack and the brute-force threat had unique network traffic signatures that were analyzed by the unsupervised ART algorithm.
The network traffic was archived in the onboard database included a timestamp, packet length, header length, checksum, source address, destination address, source port, destination port, ttl, protocol, and IP version. The brute-force test used inbound and outbound data to detect abnormal behavior ( Table 1 ). The analysis included more than 38,000 training data and over 2,400 testing data points for the inbound and outbound traffic data points. The cyber-physical attack test used over 1 million training data points and attempted to detect anomalies within a testing data set that contained more than 57,000 data points as shown in Table 1 .
The IDS algorithm on the BAIDS first pre-processed the collected data by computing the communication frequency (hits/minute) that occurred between the destination TABLE 1. Training and testing data set sizes for the brute-force and cyber-physical attack tests.
FIGURE 7.
The network traffic packet information (frequency, packet length, and checksum) was used to train the Adaptive Resonance Theory algorithm so that it could identify cyber attacks. The known network activity was labeled in classes 0 to N. However, unknown and potentially malicious traffic was labeled as -1.
and source IP address for each minute of the day. The preprocessing also computed the one minute average packet length and checksum. Each instance of the three values were presented to the ART algorithm as shown in Figure 7 . During training the ART algorithm learned inbound and outbound traffic on the public network for the brute-force test and BAS traffic for the cyber-physical test. The algorithm developed a set of templates (or categories) that represented the traffic characteristics for each connection. The templates were stored in the onboard database. Then, during testing the ART algorithm used the stored templates to analyze previously unseen frequency, packet length, and checksum data points. The algorithm labeled each known instance with a label between 0 and N that were created during the training stage. Unknown instances were labeled with a -1. The -1 indicated that it could not find a class for the inputs and was considered novel. The instances labeled with -1 were then compared with the time that the attacks were implemented to determine if the ART algorithm had accurately detected malicious network activity correctly.
IV. RESULTS
The BAIDS was used in a hardware-in-the-loop experiment. The experiment demonstrated the ability to perform advanced HVAC fan control across multiple IT networks while maintaining a trustworthy data connection. Fan control signals were sent from a nearby PV array data acquisition system on the public network, through the BAIDS interconnection device, and finally to the fan motor controller in the local BAS network. The control signal was used to synchronize the HVAC load with the electrical production from the PV power plant. The experiment used the actual fan and damper system in conjunction with a building zone thermal model with the intent to simulate the fan control performance. The IDS embedded in the BAIDS device passively monitored inbound and outbound traffic on the public and local networks. The traffic patterns were evaluated successfully using the ART ANN.
A. ADVANCED HVAC FAN CONTROL
The existing BAS controlled the fan motor speed based on the duct static pressure. The static pressure sensor value increased or decreased when the fan speed or the zone damper position was modified. This fan control script, written in the Delta Controls Software, was not changed for this experiment. Instead, the BAIDS interconnection device performed an override of the existing system and controlled the fan motor directly. When the zone temperature exceeded the temperature limits, described in Equation 2, BAIDS relinquished the override and the fan operated under the Delta Controls command. FIGURE 8. The fan and PV power had similar profiles over this three day span. The BAIDS device was able to use the PV data to control the fan so that it matched with the power produced.
The advanced control of the HVAC fan synchronized the fan motor power with the electrical output from the PV array. The fan power matched the PV production patterns as shown in Figure 8 . The fan motor followed the PV profile during smooth and intermittent PV electricity production. The control was able to modulate the fan quickly in response to the reduced PV power production caused by clouding conditions. During clouding conditions the fan speed was reduced so that the power profile remained below the PV power output.
The interconnection between the PV array monitoring device and the fan motor control was not inhibited by the BAIDS device. The signal was sent at a one minute interval and allowed for the fan motor to adjust to PV output changes. Fan speed adjustments to maintain synchronization during intermittent PV power output can be seen over a 3 hour period on September 4, 2016 in Figure 9 . Figure 9 graphs the fan power and PV output at one minute intervals. The fan power was able to stay below the PV power profile for most of the time. Additionally, the air flow rate provided by the fan did not negatively impact the comfort level for the simulated zone.
The fan control experiment was conducted over a six day period in September. The zone model used the actual outside temperature measured by NOAA and the actual air flow rate produced by the HVAC fan in the BACS testbed. The outside air temperature ranged from low of 18 • C to a high of 32 • C over the six day period. The experiment required that the building zone connected to the fan and damper system maintain a comfortable temperature. The zone temperature was able to remain between 21.6 and 23.8 • C during occupied hours when outside air temperatures exceeded 32 • C. For example, the zone temperature results are plotted over the same two day period as Figure 8 in Figure 10 . The temperature in the zone remained between the required thresholds during the day and increased to above 25 • C during the unoccupied hours. The fan control and zone model simulation was conducted in parallel with the cyber security monitoring.
B. NETWORK TRAFFIC PACKET COLLECTION
The BAIDS was used to connect the public and private network. The interconnection provided a necessary bridge that sent signals to and from the BAS private network. The connection allowed for fast, and reliable DR control of individual BAS devices. The trustworthy connection was made possible through the implementation of a passive IDS. The IDS was embedded in the interconnection device and was able to monitor, store, and analyze incoming and outgoing messages on the private and public networks.
The IDS successfully monitored and stored network traffic in near real-time. The messages were recorded in an onboard elasticsearch database. The database was structured so that inbound and outbound traffic on the public and private networks were stored as separate tables. In addition, the system monitored all of the network traffic in the BAS and recorded all IP addresses and ports in real-time. At the same time, all the traffic that communicated directly with the BAIDS device on the public network was detected and stored. The incoming traffic observed from unknown IP addresses, shown in Figure 11 , revealed the frequency at which each IP address was contacted over a 15 minute period on the private network. The different color bars in Figure 11 represent the particular IP address that sent a message. The frequency for each of the IP addresses remained below 20 hits per minute from hour 19:21 to 19:25 and then went up to above 50 hits per minute at 19:26. The lowest communication frequency for the IP address was around 10 hits per minute and the highest was above 80. The large peaks could be a potential indication of malicious cyber behavior. Hackers could be attempting to alter the state of the system by connecting with the particular device at a higher rate than usual. However, more detailed analysis would be required to make these kind of determinations. The present work used the ART neural network to analyze network messages and detect potentially malicious activity.
C. INTRUSION DETECTION
The cyber security capabilities of the BAIDS interconnection device where tested against artificially induced brute-force and cyber-physical attacks. The attacks were detected through the analysis of the collected and stored network traffic data. The one minute frequency, average packet length, and average checksum were presented to the ART neural network for training and testing. The training process considered close to 2 million data points collected on the public and private networks. The IDS detected potential cyber-physical threats by analyzing the private network activity. The brute-force threats were monitored on the public network.
The ART algorithm evaluated the outbound and inbound traffic on the public network in order to detect a brute-force threat. The training data set for the outbound traffic is shown on the left side of Figure 12 . The different colors represent the various IP addresses that were contacted by the BAIDS device. The traffic behavior with the different IP addresses varied; some of the network communications between the BAIDS and public network devices had scattered behavior and others were consistent over time. The BAS traffic, used to evaluate the cyber-physical attack, showed consistent behavior for four devices as shown on the right side of Figure 12 . The training data was used by the ART algorithm to learn normal network traffic activity. The gained knowledge was then applied to cyber threat situations with the intent to detect unwanted attacks accurately.
FIGURE 12.
The monitored traffic on the public and private networks were evaluated using the traffic frequency, average packet size, and average checksum attributes. The different colored markers describe the behavior for each device. The public network data defines the communication between various devices and BAIDS. The private network data defines the behavior for four different devices.
Cyber attacks were detected accurately by the ART algorithm in the public and private networks. The ART algorithm trained on each of the normal data set using a free parameter ρ value equal to 0.92. It identified the brute force attack by labeling outbound and inbound traffic data as normal or abnormal. For example, the ART algorithm flagged abnormal behavior in the outbound data set as shown in Figure 13 . In this case, the traffic data had a higher frequency, larger than the normal packet size, and a normal checksum for a two minute period which occurred from hour 16:57 to 16:59. This matched exactly with the simulated hacking event. The successful identification of the brute-force attack was achieved with only one false positive result. The same approach was used to detect the cyber-physical attack on the private network.
The cyber-physical attack impacted three HVAC control devices in the private network. The malicious code altered the FIGURE 13. The intrusion detection system was able to detect the brute-force attack using the Adaptive Resonance Theory neural network. It quickly identified abnormal behavior. FIGURE 14. The intrusion detection system was able to detect the cyber-physical attack. The Adaptive Resonance Theory neural network identified abnormal behavior by evaluating traffic that originated from various devices. The upside down triangles show the abnormal traffic that came from the hackers computer.
states of numerous systems connected to the HVAC control system. Unfortunately, the BAIDS device was not able to stop it from occurring, nor was it able to react to the attack and return the states back to normal. However, it was able to accurately detect the event and identify the devices impacted. The ART algorithm detected abnormal behavior from the adversary's device as shown in Figure 14 by evaluating the source IP information. The destination IP address results produced by the ART algorithm identified each of the impacted devices. The algorithm had a 100% true positive rate and flagged only two false alarms.
V. CONCLUSION
Direct control of HVAC devices from a centralized location for DR can be achieved using an intelligent and secure interconnection device. The BAIDS successfully bridged two networks to provide direct communication between an HVAC control devices and a solar PV array. The hardware-in-theloop experiment successfully synchronized the fan motor power with the PV electrical output without disturbing the thermal comfort levels inside a simulated thermal zone of a building. At the same time, one second monitoring of network traffic on the private and public networks was implemented to perform passive intrusion detection. The network data was collected and made available through a HMI database interface. The network data was then used by an ART algorithm to identify anomalies and potentially malicious activity.
Future work will expand on this work to upgrade the controls and provide active intrusion detection capabilities. The goal is to improve interoperability between the utility and commercial building operators. Improved interoperability will allow for DR to occur without imposing discomfort to the building occupants. For example, utilities could work with building operators to connect with a large amount of dispatchable loads, receive feedback to adjust controls, and target the best loads for the utility and the users at any given moment in time. This most be done with cyber security in mind.
Real-time cyber threat analysis using learning based algorithms has the potential to monitor, evaluate, and flag traffic at specific ports and IP addresses. The current work tested a single ANN algorithm. The next step is to perform detailed experiments that test the abilities of various algorithms to identify threats on BAS. The experiment will evaluate the algorithms ability to analyze network traffic anomalies and state changes in the cyber-physical system.
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